People asked if China would catch up to the United States. Then the question became when will China catch up. And now it’s slowly becoming about whether anyone can stop China from becoming the world’s single superpower.
The United States has weakened itself through political division and policy missteps. China may stand taller by default, although still facing some economic troubles.
But power is never absolute. China is strong in scale and speed but still fragile in the foundations that define lasting global leadership.
The weight of scale
China’s rise isn’t just about growth rates. It is about mass and reach.
The country produces more goods than any other nation and controls most of the world’s clean energy supply chain. Around 70% of global solar manufacturing happens in China, and it leads in batteries and electric vehicles.
This production base gives Beijing leverage no country has enjoyed since America’s industrial peak in the 1950s.
Factories in Guangdong or Chongqing can transform toys to electric buses within months. That flexibility gives China power during crises.
When others scramble for supply, China builds it. Its manufacturing model still depends on low profits and high volume, but its ability to deliver at scale remains unmatched. In a world of shortages, capacity itself becomes a weapon.
Where power still falls short
Despite its dominance in production, China has not created the financial muscle that defines a superpower.
And that’s because the renminbi is not, and likely will never be a global reserve currency. As of today, less than 4% of international payments use it, while the dollar still accounts for nearly 60% of global reserves.
At the same time, capital in and out of China remains tightly controlled, and investors are faced with never-ending political risk. Without open markets and legal protections, the world will not store its wealth in Chinese assets.
The same weakness limits China’s influence in crises. The United States can print safe assets and move markets with a single policy decision. China cannot. Its financial system still depends on state direction and fragile local banks.
This weakness has grown more visible since Beijing turned to industrial policy as the engine of growth. When the property boom collapsed, the government shifted its credit machine toward manufacturing.
State banks were told to lend to factories instead of developers, and subsidies poured into sectors like electric vehicles, solar panels and robotics. Analysts estimate this industrial push is worth about 4.4% of GDP, a scale unmatched by any modern economy.
At home, the structure of China’s financial system exposes the limits of state control. Credit is abundant but often misdirected.
Total debt now exceeds 300 per cent of GDP, and the property sector is still digesting years of overbuilding and speculation. Local governments and regional banks remain entangled in hidden liabilities, leaving Beijing to orchestrate bailouts piecemeal.
In this environment, growth depends on ever more lending to offset past excess. The result is deflationary pressure and falling returns. For all its command over factories, China cannot yet manage global finance.
The alliance gap
Military strength counts, but alliances multiply it. Here, China remains isolated. It has partners, but not allies.
Russia, Iran and North Korea share interests of convenience, not mutual defense. By contrast, America still leads a global network of democratic and economic partners.
Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia and India together represent economic power on par with China and the US combined.
However, Donald Trump’s second term has weakened these bonds. Tariffs on allies, insults at summits and a focus on domestic fights have made America look unreliable.
But China has not filled that space. Its “no-limits” friendship with Russia is driven by strategy, with trust still being absent.
In Asia, most countries want China’s trade but America’s protection. Influence without allies is power that cannot travel far.
The cost of control
China’s state system can move fast. It builds bridges, ports and data centres in record time. Yet that same control slows innovation. Local officials still measure success by construction and job counts, instead of efficiency or profitability.
Overproduction has become chronic. The term “involution”, which means endless competition that destroys returns, is now part of official language.
Factories keep running even when profits disappear. Local governments rescue firms to avoid unemployment, and the result is deflation and wasted capital.
Investment still drives more than 40% of China’s GDP while household consumption stays near 40%, far below America’s 68%. Without stronger consumer spending, China risks the same stagnation that hit Japan after its boom.
Demographics add pressure. The fertility rate is near 1.0, among the world’s lowest. The working-age population will shrink after the mid-2040s. A shrinking workforce means slower growth and heavier pension costs. Education and automation may offset the trend for a while, but not forever.
A superpower by default
China’s position today is as much about America’s decline as its own rise.
Washington’s trade wars have hurt its manufacturing base more than China’s. Cuts to science funding and attacks on universities have damaged the US advantage in research.
Its retreat from global cooperation leaves allies uncertain. So Beijing looks more stable by comparison.
Still, superpower status requires more than being the last giant standing. China lacks the trust that comes from transparency, the magnetism of open society, and the self-renewal that democracy, for all its chaos, can deliver.
Its economic model remains state-driven and its politics personal. Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power improves command but raises succession risks.
The question is not whether China is powerful, because it is. The question whether it can stay flexible enough to manage its own success.
China’s century is not inevitable, but neither is America’s recovery. The global order is shifting toward a world with two gravitational centers: the US-led financial alliance and China’s industrial sphere.
The future depends on whether either can rebuild what the other lacks, which for China, it’s trust and consumption. For the United States, it’s discipline and competence.
As of today, China stands as one superpower, but not the superpower. It dominates supply chains, shapes prices and forces others to react.
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